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DNA typing has dramatically altered the criminal legal process.'
Hearings to determine the admissibility of DNA typing are often
lengthy, some lasting several weeks or months.2 The legal discovery
process has scrutinized virtually every aspect of the procedures that
testing laboratories use to evaluate DNA evidence. These measures
are typically government funded, and significant expenditures of ef-
fort, time and money are involved in litigating the admissibility of
DNA evidence. One would think, therefore, that DNA typing evi-
dence has routinely been used to convict defendants where a convic-
tion would have been impossible without the evidence. However,
DNA evidence merely provides corroborative evidence in all but a
handful of cases.
* Deputy District Attorney, Alameda County District Attorney's Office, California.
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1967; J.D., University of San Francisco, 1974. Mr.
Harmon has been with the Alameda County District Attorney's Office for 19 years.
1 This form of forensic evidence testing compares biological evidence associated
with criminal activity with known samples. The evidence may consist of sexual assault
samples, where the comparison is made with a suspect's known sample. It may also
consist of blood or other biological material from a victim of a violent crime, which is
located on something associated with a suspect. When the evidence and the known sam-
ple compare favorably, an estimate is calculated as to the commonness of the compari-
son. This form of forensic evidence is described as "associative evidence."
What sets DNA typing apart from previous forms of biological evidence compari-
sons is the strength of the association. Once the evidence and the known samples have
been compared and appear to match, calculations are performed to show how frequently
these matching patterns might occur in some general reference population. Typically,
these calculations are performed from databases which have been collected and ana-
lyzed from major groups such as Caucasians, African Americans, and Hispanics.
2 See, e.g., People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); People v.
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Axell, I Cal. Rptr. 2d 411
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991); United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
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Critics of DNA typing have suggested that innocent people
have been convicted by DNA evidence and, conversely, that inno-
cent people have been convicted because DNA typing was not per-
formed. 3 Both of these statements cannot be correct. 4 This is
simply rhetoric designed to convince trial courts to continue to al-
low each defendant to challenge the DNA evidence, whether or not
the law affords the right to such challenges. In most cases involving
DNA evidence, tried by court orjury, the DNA evidence was merely
corroborative evidence of the defendant's guilt. 5 Two separate
cases in which this author was involved demonstrate this point.
These cases were prosecuted separately and were initially assigned
to different appellate panels for review. The appellate panel reas-
signed and consolidated the appeals sua sponte.6
In responding to these criticisms, this article will consider vari-
ous interpretations of legal admissibility standards in order to ap-
preciate the impact DNA has had on the legal process in this area. It
will then discuss the overreaction of the legal system to DNA typing
evidence and will comment on the wave of admissibility litigation
which has engulfed the legal system. It will describe how the evi-
dence typically is presented to juries and will finally discuss the use
of DNA typing in the post-conviction setting.
II. LEGAL ADMISSIBILITy DEBATE ISSUES
7
Legal admissibility criteria ensure that evidence which is to be
3 PeterJ. Neufeld, an outspoken critic of DNA typing, has declared that "hundreds
of innocent people may be behind bars because courts never doubted DNA evidence."
Peter J. Neufeld, DNA Evidence May Be Used in Legere Trial, TELEGRAPH-J. (Fredericton,
N.B., Canada), Aug. 11, 1990, at 3. Recently, Neufeld's colleague, Barry Scheck, de-
clared: "There are probably far more people rotting in jail who didn't commit crimes
than any of us believed." Rorie Sherman, DNA Unraveling, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at I.
This latter comment was made to urge that DNA evidence be used to free these innocent
people.
4 Research has not disclosed any case in which it has been demonstrated that a DNA
testing laboratory's incorrect match of two samples contributed to the conviction of an
innocent defendant.
5 See, e.g., Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985; Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731; Axell, I Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 411. In fact, in most cases in which trial courts excluded the prosecution's
DNA evidence, the defendants were convicted on the basis of the remaining evidence.
See, e.g., State v. Pennell, No. IN88-12-0051 (New Castle Co., Del. Super. Ct. 1989);
State v. Wheeler, No. C89-090 1CR (Washington Co., Or. Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 1990); State v.
Passino, No. 185-1-90 (Franklin Co., Vt. Dist. Ct. May 13, 1991); People v. Fleming, No.
90-CR-2716 (Cook Co., Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 1991); State v. Despain, No. 15589 (Yuma
Co., Ariz. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 1991).
6 Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731.
7 Use of the term "controversy" does not accurately reflect the level of
disagreement which occurs in a typical admissibility hearing. Defense testimony usually
criticizes certain specifics of how the tests were performed and describes areas in which
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presented to juries meets some minimum threshold.8 Some juris-
dictions define these criteria by statute,9 while other jurisdictions
have developed the standards through case law.10 In either in-
stance, once the foundational predicate is demonstrated, the jury is
allowed to hear the evidence in order to assist it in deciding whether
or not a criminal defendant is guilty. In the area of new scientific
techniques, the general acceptance of the technique often plays a
key role in deciding the admissibility of the evidence.1
DNA typing evidence has significantly altered the manner in
which admissibility litigation is conducted. Previously, once a scien-
tific technique was ruled admissible, the defense had no right to an
admissibility hearing, at which the prosecution had to demonstrate
the requisite foundation. 12 An early New York trial court ruling in-
volving DNA, People v. Castro,'3 dramatically changed the scope of
the foundational requirements. In addition to requiring a showing
of general acceptance, the trial court also insisted that the propo-
nent of the DNA evidence demonstrate the quality of the work actu-
ally performed for the specific case. This additional element meant
that legal precedent concerning a new scientific technique would
not put an end to the requirement for admissibility hearings. The
defense would always have the right to challenge the admissibility of
errors might be made. Defendants rarely have their own analyses performed. Most
defense experts have never performed forensic DNA tests. See generally James Wooley &
Rockne P. Harmon, The Forensic DNA Brouhaha: Sdence or Debate?, 51 AM. J. HuM.
GENETICS 1164-65 (1992).
The debate presently focuses on the statistical aspect of forensic DNA typing. The
term "controversy" in this setting only perpetuates the myth that innocent defendants
might be wrongly convicted based on DNA evidence.
8 The foundational facts may vary. The issue may be voluntariness of a statement,
suggestiveness of an identification, or general acceptance of a new scientific technique.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 793-96 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "applies even to something as complicated as DNA
profiling"); State v. Brown, 470 N.W.2d 30, 30-32 (Iowa 1991) (holding DNA evidence
admissible under Iowa Rules of Evidence 702 and 703); Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429,
431 (Ark. 1991) (holding DNA evidence admissible under Arkansas Rules of Evidence
402 and 702).
10 See, e.g., People v. Fishback, 851 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1993); Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
731; United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 163-66 (N.D. Ohio 1991); State v. Ford, 392
S.E.2d 781, 782-83 (S.C. 1990); People v. Wesley, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992).
11 General acceptance is the key question in jurisdictions that follow Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The same question also plays a significant role in
jurisdictions that have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. See generally Rockne P.
Harmon, General Admissibility Considerations for DNA Typing Evidence: Let's Learn From the
Past and Let Scientists Decide This Time Around, in FORENSIc DNA TECHNOLOGY (Mark A.
Farley &JamesJ. Harrington eds., 1991).
12 People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976); Fishback, 851 P.2d at 884.
13 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987, 998-99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
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the evidence, no matter how well established the technique had be-
come. 14 Some jurisdictions have adopted the Castro rationale.1 5
Others have expressly rejected it and have declined to provide a
legal forum for a perpetual admissibility debate.' 6 The first appellate
decision in New York expressly rejected Castro's expanded admissi-
bility criteria.
17
III. DNA TYPING EVIDENCE IN PRACTICE: BARNEY AND HOWARD
A. PEOPLE V. BARNEY' 8
Ralph Edwards Barney accosted his victim in the South Hayward
Bay Area Rapid Transit ("BART") parking lot. He forced his way
into her car, demanding money and wielding a knife. He forced the
victim to drive several blocks, where "he penetrated her vagina with
his fingers, attempted unsuccessfully to rape her and force her to
perform oral copulation, and ejaculated on her clothing."' 9 He
took her car keys, approximately $2.00 in change and her BART
ticket with $3.80 remaining on it.20 The victim called the police af-
ter she found Barney's wallet on the car floor. When the police ar-
rived, she identified Barney from a California identification found in
his wallet. Officers arrested Barney at the address on the identifica-
tion found in the wallet. 2 ' The police seized a knife, a BART ticket
with $2.20 remaining on it and $1.82 in change found in Barney's
possession and on his front porch. The BART ticket had last been
used to enter the transit system at the South Hayward BART sta-
tion, and the BART fare between that station and one near Barney's
address was $1.60, the same amount by which the victim's BART
ticket was reduced after the assault.22 At police headquarters, the
victim identified Barney as her assailant. She subsequently identi-
fied him at a lineup, at the preliminary examination and at trial.
23
Before trial, she identified two knives, one of which was the seized
knife. She also identified the BART ticket found in Barney's posses-
14 See generally Rockne P. Harmon, How Has DNA Evidence Fared? Beauty is in the Eye of
the Beholder, 1 EXPERT EVID. REP. No. 6, 149, 150-52 (1990).
15 See State v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781, 783 (S.C. 1990); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d
422, 425-27 (Minn. 1989).
16 See Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d 144 (Kan. 1991); State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107
(Ohio 1992).
17 People v. Wesley, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198-99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
18 People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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sion at trial. 24 DNA analysis by Cellmark Diagnostics ("Cellmark")
indicated that Barney's DNA pattern matched the DNA pattern in
semen found on the victim's clothing. The frequency of such a pat-
tern is 1 in 7.8 million in the African-American population. 25
The admissibility hearing was held in the summer of 1989.26
Four prosecution witnesses and three defense witnesses testified
over a period of three weeks. In addition, the court took judicial
notice of the admissibility hearing transcript in People v. Axell.
27
B. PEOPLE V. HOWARD
2 8
Octavia Matthews was found bleeding from multiple head
wounds with a rope wrapped around her neck. 29 She died soon af-
ter of blunt trauma to the head and asphyxia caused by blunt neck
trauma.30 Kevin O'Neal Howard, one of Matthews' tenants in an-
other building, was behind in his rent payments and previously had
been served with an eviction notice.31 Police found Howard's wallet
at Matthews' home under some newspaper on a bloodstained couch,
and his fingerprint was found on a postcard in a bedroom.3 2 Ac-
cording to conventional blood group analysis, Howard's blood and
some of the crime scene bloodstains shared an unusual blood type
found in approximately 1.2 persons out of 1,000 in the African-
American population. This blood type is not found at all in the cau-
casion population.3 3 DNA analysis indicated that Howard's DNA
pattern matched the pattern in the bloodstains. The frequency of
this pattern in the African-American population is 1 in 200
million.3
4
The trial court conducted a Kelly-Frye hearing to determine the
admissibility of the DNA evidence. 35 The court heard expert testi-
mony from both sides and admitted transcripts of the previous Kelly-
24 Id.
25 Id. at 734.
26 California's admissibility standard is known as the Kelly-Frye rule because Califor-
nia adopted Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), in People v. Kelly, 549
P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
27 Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 734.
28 Although factually unrelated, Barney and Howard were consolidated for review
because they involved similar identity issues and underlying scientific principles. Id. at
732.









Frye hearings in People v. Barney and People v. Axell.36 The court ruled
that the evidence was admissible under Kelly-Frye. At trial, Howard
testified that he had gone to Matthews' home to discuss his rent and
get a receipt for a prior payment. While searching for a receipt, he
emptied a pouch filled with his personal items, including his wallet,
which he accidentally left at the Matthews' home. He stated that he
never attacked Matthews, and she was still alive when he left her
home.3 7 Howard's defense suggested that another tenant of Mat-
thews may have committed the homicide.38 A jury convicted How-
ard of second-degree murder with great bodily injury. He was
sentenced to prison for fifteen years to life.
39
Admissibility hearings were held in both Barney and Howard.
40
The testimony heard pertained to the issues as they existed at that
time. The hearing records were supplemented by judicial notice of
other trial court hearing records in which additional witnesses testi-
fied. In each case, the actual testimony took about three weeks. At
the end, each trial judge ruled the evidence admissible. In Barney,
the defendant waived his right to a jury trial. In Howard, the jury
had no difficulty deciding the identity of the murderer when it con-
sidered the DNA evidence in the context of the remaining evidence.
C. THE BARNEY/HOWARD APPELLATE PROCESS
These two separate cases were consolidated after the appellate
briefs in Barney had been filed. In February 1992, after the final
briefs were filed in Howard, the appellate court invited the parties to
file supplemental briefs addressing a pair of conflicting articles ap-
pearing in the prestigious journal, Science.4 1 Several months later, in
June 1992, before the appellate court had scheduled the cases for
oral argument, the court invited the parties to file supplemental
36 Id. at 734.
37 Barney, 10 Cal. App. 2d at 733.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 The hearing in Barney was in 1989. The hearing in Howard was in 1990.
41 See Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typ-
ing, 254 SCIENCE 1745 (1991); Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of
DNA Typing in Forensic Work, 254 SCIENCE 1735 (1991).
Lewontin and Hartd asserted that estimates produced by forensic DNA tests may be
in error by a factor of 100 in either direction. The errors they claimed were due to
ethnic groups in which there may be differences in frequencies. They insisted that these
ethnic groups must be sampled to determine the magnitude of these frequency differ-
ences, if any.
The article by Chakraborty and Kidd is a reply to the article by Lewontin and Hartl.
The authors point out errors in the article and insist that there is no need to sample the
ethnic groups because forensic frequency differences are not as great as Lewontin and
Hard claim they might be.
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briefs addressing the report just released by the National Research
Council ("NRC").42 After considering these supplemental briefs,
the court held that the two trial courts' admissibility rulings were
erroneous, in light of the Science articles and the NRC report.43
There is one aspect of the decision that could have a profound
effect on the use of scientific evidence in the legal system. In ruling
that DNA evidence had not satisfied California's Kelly-Frye rule,44 the
court based its decision on criticisms and articles that were not even
in existence at the time of the admissibility hearings in either of the
two cases. Specifically, the court relied on the apparent conflict of
opinions expressed in the two articles in Science45 when it noted a
level of disagreement, which appeared to undermine the scientific
community's general acceptance of forensic DNA frequency estima-
tion procedures. 46 The court declined to evaluate the competing
contentions, explaining:
Our task is not to choose sides in this dispute over the reliability of the
statistical calculation process. Once we discern a lack of general scien-
tific acceptance-which in this instance is palpable-we have no choice
but to exclude the "bottom line" expression of statistical significance
in its current form.
47
In other words, the court conducted its own limited review of scien-
tific literature, found a level of diverging scientific opinion, and
ruled the evidence inadmissible. The court expressly refused to as-
sess the competing contentions it had discovered in its own
research.
What is wrong with this standard of review? First, the opinion
fails to address any of the issues that were debated during the two
42 COMMrrrEE ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992).
43 Since the Barney/Howard appeal was decided in August 1992, one additional appel-
late DNA case has been decided by the same panel that decided Barney/Howard. See
People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 724-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). Until other geo-
graphic appellate districts decide cases arising from within their own areas, it is too soon
to assess the full impact of the legal analysis relied upon by the Barney court.
The rationale in Barney has also been relied upon in at least one other jurisdiction.
See United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629 (D.C. 1992).
44 People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
45 Lewontin & Hard, supra note 41; Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 41.
46 People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
47 Id. The court could not see the forest from the trees. The original estimate
presented in the trial in Barney was 1:7 million. Based on Lewontin and Hartl's criti-
cisms, this estimate could be anywhere from 1:70,000 to 1:700 million. When the calcu-
lations were performed in accordance with the National Research Council's
recommendations, the estimate was 1:6 million. The court felt that the dispute over




different admissibility hearings. 48 It also defines a new level of ap-
pellate review, whereby changes of scientific opinion which occur
while convictions are being slowly processed through the appellate
system can be used to undermine trial court admissibility rulings
which addressed all existing issues. At least one state supreme court
has recognized the danger of attempting such an assimilation. The
Colorado Supreme Court refused to consider developments in the
scientific community which occurred after the trial court's admissibil-
ity decision.49 Recently, the Arizona Supreme Court expressly re-
jected Colorado's analysis and sided with Barney's method of
review. 50 The decision held that "the [trial] court erred in admitting
the probability testimony based on the product rule calculations."-51
Later, the decision recognized that "[i]t is somewhat incongruous to
call the trial court's ruling 'error.' Nearly all the scientific literature
and case law on which we rely was unavailable when the evidence
was admitted at trial." 52 The Arizona Supreme Court referred to
the analysis in People v. Fishback53 as a "snapshot." 54 The decision
recommends "viewing the motion picture[ ] of technological ad-
vancement, ' 55 as employed in Barney/Howard,56 as the appropriate
method to review DNA typing evidence. The characterization of the
two competing and irreconcilable approaches as a "snapshot" on
the one hand, and a "motion picture" on the other, is not as simple
as it seems. Once an appellate decision is rendered, even under the
motion picture analysis, the movie stops and becomes a snapshot
just as the trial court's decision was a snapshot at the time it was
rendered. This appellate "snapshot" cannot be legal precedent be-
cause the "motion picture[ ] of technological advancement" 57 con-
48 At the time of the admissibility hearings in these cases, neither Lewontin nor Hartd
had ever testified or publicly voiced an opinion on this subject. In addition, the National
Research Council had not yet formed a committee to conduct its review. The admissibil-
ity hearing focused on many technical issues having to do with the testing procedures, as
well as with statistical tests performed on the databases by one of the defense experts.
49 People v. Fishback, 851 P.2d 884, 896, 900 (Colo. 1993). This decision found that
forensic DNA evidence was generally accepted. It placed the burden on the defense to
show that subsequent changes in scientific opinion were significant enough to under-
mine the finding of general acceptance and cause the evidence to be excluded. This
principle also exists in California law in People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1246 (Cal.
1976). It is unclear why Barney did not adhere to this principle.
50 See State v. Bible, No. CR-90-0167-AP, 1993 WL 306544 (Ariz. Aug. 12, 1993) (en
banc).
51 Id. at *28.
52 Id. at *55 n.33.
53 851 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1993) (en banc).
54 Bible, 1993 WL 306544 at *55 n.33.
55 Id.
56 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
57 Bible, 1993 WL 306544 at *55 n.33.
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tinues beyond the date of the appellate decision and must be
reviewed by subsequent courts. In California, death penalty ap-
peals, which go directly to the California Supreme Court, can take
seven years or more before an appellate decision is rendered. How
will these courts be able to assimilate seven years of scientific evolu-
tion of opinion, if they are asked to do so? If this form of appellate
analysis is correct, shouldn't it also be carried over into habeas
corpus proceedings? For example, should a defendant whose con-
viction has been affirmed on appeal be entitled to habeas corpus
relief because the "scientific landscape" of opinion has changed
since his conviction was affirmed? 58
The Barney/Howard decision constitutes judicial abdication of
the court's role on another significant legal point. The court per-
formed its own limited survey of scientific literature. When it found
some level of disagreement, it declined to try to resolve the issues,
claiming this would exceed its role under People v. Kelly. 59 The court
depended on an article by two prominent scientists to create this
impasse.60 In an amicus curiae brief, the appellate court was re-
minded that Lewontin and Hartl had presented their views in live
testimony in two earlier cases and the evidence was ruled admissible
in spite of their critical opinions. 6t In these two earlier cases, the
judges admitted the DNA evidence by distinguishing between criti-
cisms that were relevant to the weight of the evidence, criticisms
that were relevant to the admissibility of the evidence and criticisms
which were relevant to the weight to be given to the evidence once
admitted. Such distinctions are based in law, not in science. The
Barney decision dodged this issue with the statement: "[o]ur task
under Kelly-Frye is not to choose sides .... "62 This comment ig-
nores long-standing legal precedent in California that questions
about statistics derived from biological evidence testing relate to the
58 This exact scenario is presently being played out in California. People v. Axell, 1
Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), was the state's first appellate ruling on the admis-
sibility of DNA evidence. The decision pre-dates Barney/Howard and found the technol-
ogy passed Frye. Ms. Axell has sought habeas corpus relief based on the BarneyHoward
decision because of the perceived change of scientific opinion. Interestingly, the admis-
sibility hearings in Axell and Barney were being conducted at the same time. The trial
judge in Axell has denied Axell's request for habeas corpus relief.
59 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
60 Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 41, at 1745.
61 The two cases are United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992) and
United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 165 (N.D. Ohio 1992). Both cases ruled that the
DNA evidence passed Frye, notwithstanding the views of Lewontin and Hartl.
62 People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). This statement
is even more perplexing when one considers that the range of estimates agreed upon by
all, even Lewontin and Hard is from 1:70,000 to 1:700 million, and the estimate
presented at the trial was 1:7 million.
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weight to be given to the evidence, not its admissibility.63 The Bar-
ney/Howard court's refusal to make the legal distinction between
weight and admissibility leaves it hopelessly mired in a controversy
of its own making.
The Barney/Howard court concluded its discussion of the cur-
rent state of affairs of forensic DNA typing with a reference to the
National Research Council's report on forensic DNA typing, which
was released in spring 1992.64 After determining that there was a
change in the scientific consensus based on the Science article by
Lewontin and Hartl, the court suggested that the report provided a
generally accepted "common ground" 65 for future cases. The NRC
report recommends a modification of past estimation procedures to
produce more conservative estimates, which would also satisfy
Lewontin and Hartl's concerns.
Since the NRC report was issued, it has been utilized in many
different ways by appellate courts. At least one appellate court has
refused to consider it because it was not part of the trial court rec-
ord.66 Some courts have followed the Barney approach and used the
report to rule that the methods used in the trial court were inappro-
priate even though the report was not in existence at the time of the
admissibility hearing.67 Others have considered the report and
found that the methods used earlier pass the admissibility stan-
dard.68 Recently, the same appellate panel which decided Barney
chastised the scientific community for criticizing aspects of the re-
port in the peer review literature. 69
Clearly, courts can reach a number of quite different, and often
irreconcilable, conclusions about scientific evidence. Unfortunately,
the end result often depends on how the courts define the extent of
their legal responsibilities, not on the quality of scientific evidence
before them. This is unfortunate because it is the inconsistent use
or abuse of some principle of law that results in evidence being
63 People v. Yorba, 257 Cal. Rptr. 641, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
64 COMMITTEE ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 42.
65 Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745.
66 State v. Myers, No. 03C019108CR00255, 1992 WL 297626 at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Oct. 22, 1992).
67 People v. Pizarro, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); United States v.
Porter, 618 A.2d 629 (D.C. 1992); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502 (Wash. 1993).
68 State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107, 112-13, 115 (Ohio 1992); State v. Jobe, 486
N.W.2d 407, 419-20 (Minn. 1992); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 821 (Va.
1992).
69 People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). The over-
whelming weight of peer review scientific literature has criticized the statistics section of
the report as being unnecessary, unscientific, and arbitrary. See, e.g., Peter Aldhous, Ge-
neticists Attack NRC Report as Scientifically Indefensible, 259 SCIENCE 755, 755-56 (1993).
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withheld from the factfinder, and not some deficiency in the science.
Trial judges who see witnesses in person, view exhibits while the
witnesses are actually pointing to them and often ask their own
questions, rarely have difficulty ruling the evidence admissible. To
date, hundreds of trial judges have ruled DNA typing evidence ad-
missible. Only recently have the mixed results previously dis-
cussed 70 emerged at the appellate level where face-to-face contact
and cross examination do not occur. What is there about seeing
DNA typing evidence presented live which makes seeing believing?
IV. TRIAL PRESENTATION OF DNA TEST RESULTS
DNA evidence is usually corroborative evidence of a defend-
ant's guilt. The fact that the convictions of defendants Barney,
Howard, and Wallace were affirmed based solely on the other evi-
dence provided against them demonstrates this point quite clearly.7 1
Yet, the Barney decision justifies the need for continued, expanded
legal scrutiny of DNA evidence due to its concern that jurors must
not be asked "to decide the substantive merits of competing scien-
tific opinion as to the reliability of a novel method of scientific
proof."7 2 Cases that depend exclusively on DNA evidence are actu-
ally very rare. A jury should not be expected to understand DNA
typing within the confines of the jury box and in the contentious
atmosphere of a criminal trial.7 3 When the evidence is presented in
the context of the entire body of additional evidence, the jury can
appreciate that it is yet another piece of information which contin-
ues to support the hypothesis that the defendant is guilty, and sup-
ports no other reasonable hypothesis. Yet appellate decisions such
as Barney seem driven by the need to protect jurors from being over-
whelmed by DNA evidence, while at the same time the decisions
concede that it is harmless error for the evidence to have been
admitted.7 4
The end product of the DNA typing process is called an autora-
70 See Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725-26; Pizarro, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 436; Porter, 618
A.2d at 629;Jobe, 486 N.W.2d at 419-20; Pierce, 597 N.E.2d at 112-13, 115; Myers, 1992
WL 297626 at *1; Satcher, 421 S.E.2d at 821; Cauthron, 846 P.2d at 502.
71 Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 727; People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 747-48
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
72 Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742.
73 Does anyone complain that the intoxilyzer, the neutron activation test, or the scan-
ning electron microscope are not easily understood by a lay jury? In civil cases, are
juries really expected to understand the methods used to calculate the value of a lost life
in a wrongful death/product liability action?
74 In Wallace, the court expanded the criticisms it voiced in Barney and at the same
time it upheld the serial rape convictions because there was ample evidence to convict
without the DNA. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 721.
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diograph or autorad. The process itself is nothing more than a bio-
logical side-by-side comparison test to see if known and unknown
samples might have had a common origin. The autorad is a piece of
film which shows these comparison results in columnar form. Usu-
ally four separate tests are performed, each producing its own
autorad.75 A typical rape case illustrates the raw graphic power of
DNA typing. The evidence in such a case often consists of a vaginal
swab, a stain from an item of clothing, perhaps also from a bed-
sheet, or a car seat. The known samples usually consist of the vic-
tim's blood sample, the samples of one or more suspects, and
frequently a sample from the victim's last known consensual sex
partner. If all of these samples were run in the same series of tests,
the most dramatic observation a juror would make is that all the
known samples produce very different patterns. Very seldom would
any of these samples appear to be even remotely similar on any one
of the autorads. Even if there was a similarity, the next autorad
would show that the samples are actually very different. If all of the
sperm DNA patterns in the evidence samples previously described
matched one of the known samples and were easily distinguished
from the other samples, the impact of the evidence would be power-
ful without understanding anything about biology.
The statistical estimates, which are calculated to provide some
sense for how rare the matching pattern may be, are the focal point
of today's admissibility debate. But even in the typical rape case, or
in factual settings comparable to those which occurred in Bar-
ney/Howard or Wallace, the fact of the match alone can be considered
along with the rest of the case in deciding whether or not the de-
fendant is guilty.
Several years ago, claims were made that innocent suspects
were being convicted based on DNA evidence because DNA typing
was rushed into the legal system by allegedly mercenary private
labs. 76 These claims have never been substantiated. There has
never been a case in which opposing sides have each had their own
DNA analyses performed and conflicting, irreconcilable results were
produced.77 Now, there is a great rush to have biological evidence
in old cases tested, after all appellate remedies have been ex-
75 See William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of Neu Genetic Identification
Tests: Lessons from the "DNA ar, " 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 33-42 (1993) for a
detailed discussion of DNA typing.
76 Neufeld, supra note 3, at 3.
77 Defense analysis of prosecution evidence in criminal cases is quite rare. The fact
that those few defense analyses which have been performed have not been presented in
court to impeach prosecution results suggests that the analyses corroborated the first
results.
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hausted. 78 Significant media attention has been given to a few cases
in which defendants were ultimately exonerated by post-conviction
DNA typing. Most of those cases were prosecuted before the advent
of DNA typing.
These cases may not be as easy to resolve as they might appear
at first blush. Several points must be considered when presented
with a request to make biological evidence in a previously adjudi-
cated case available for DNA typing. First, the materiality of the evi-
dence must be considered. Is the evidence truly material to the
issue of identification? Is the victim alive? Is there a possibility of
previous, unreported consensual sex? If there is an apparent exclu-
sion of the convicted defendant, could the result be from an unre-
ported sex act? If all of these questions cannot be clearly answered
in advance, there is little reason to perform a DNA test since it is
known that the results might not provide a definitive answer.
The strength of the case is also at issue. The potential for an
exculpatory result should be assessed in the context of the balance
of the existing evidence. If the evidence against the defendant is
overwhelming, it would make little difference that DNA typing of
the biological evidence might exclude him.
79
Once appellate remedies are exhausted, most jurisdictions pro-
vide little or no access to physical evidence for evaluation by a con-
victed defendant. Often, requests for such evidence are labeled
"discovery" 80 and are justified under the authority of Brady v. Mary-
land.8 l However, requests that rely on Brady are erroneous since
Brady "does not stand for the proposition that the right to postjudg-
ment discovery is of federal constitutional dimension. ' 82 It should
also be remembered that the material withheld in Brady was clearly
exculpatory on its face. One court refused to include the biological
evidence within the Brady purview because the exculpatory potential
of the evidence was "purely speculative. ' 8 3 Another court extended
the protection afforded in Brady to material that only has the potential
to be exculpatory.
8 4
No one should deny the possibility that a suspect can be
78 See generally DNA Exclusions: New Groundsfor Attacking Old Convictions, BNA CRIMINAL
PRACTICE MANUAL (1992).
79 See State v. White, 617 A.2d 272 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1992).
80 Sewell v. State, 592 N.E.2d 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Brison,
618 A.2d 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
81 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
82 People v. Ainsworth, 266 Cal. Rptr. 175, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
83 People v. Buxton, 593 N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
84 Sewell, 592 N.E.2d at 705.
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wrongly convicted.8 5 Requests for post-conviction DNA testing
should be treated seriously by both prosecution and defense. How-
ever, claims have been made that there are many more innocent
people in prison, simply based on the handful of exclusions which
have occurred to date.8 6 Rhetoric such as this serves no useful pur-
pose. These few exceptions demonstrate two things quite clearly.
First, the legal system is already capable of detecting those injustices
by statutes and precedent already in place.8 7 Second, the very same
DNA technology that is being strenuously resisted by many attor-
neys and scientists may be the only means to rectify those few
wrongs.
V. CONCLUSION
DNA evidence burst into the media spotlight with great fanfare
in 1988.88 The early litigation in opposition to the evidence was
minimal.8 9 Now, the legal system finds itself having created new,
expanded protections for defendants based on the misconception
that the potential power of the evidence necessitated the changes.90
Five years later, all that can really be said about the changes is that
they cost the taxpayers significant amounts of money. Defendants
continue to be convicted, with or without DNA testing. Improper
convictions are detected and remedied because of DNA testing. Yet
the rhetoric continues to flow.
85 See, e.g., State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989). Woodall's conviction was
affirmed by the West Virginia Supreme Court. He was granted a new trial based on
DNA test results performed on the biological evidence which showed that he was not the
source of the semen which could only have come from the assailant. Woodall v. Legur-
sky, No. 89-C-1332 (Cabell Co., W.Va. June 28, 1991). The prosecution subsequently
elected not to retry Woodall, and the charges were dismissed.
In pursuing his claim of innocence, Woodall discovered serious irregularities in the
evidence that was used to convict him in his original trial. The State of West Virginia
awarded him one million dollars for the erroneous conviction. John MacCormack, Enm-
battled Crime Lab Tech Fired, SAN ANTONIo EXPRESS NEWS, July 28, 1993, at IF.
86 Neufeld, supra note 3, at 3.
87 See generally DNA Exclusions: New Grounds for Attacking Old Convictions, supra note 78.
This article describes successful attempts to obtain biological evidence for DNA testing
within the existing legal framework.
88 See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
89 Id.
90 "It is the expression of statistical meaning, stated in terms of vanishingly small
match probabilities, that makes the evidence so compelling." People v. Barney, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 731, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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